Differential Fault Analysis on 3DES Middle Rounds Based on Error Propagation

MA Xiangliang; ZHANG Lizhen; WU Liji; LI Xia; ZHANG Xiangmin; LI Bing; LIU Yuling

doi:10.1049/cje.2021.00.117

Volume 31 Issue 1

Jan. 2022

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MA Xiangliang, ZHANG Lizhen, WU Liji, et al., “Differential Fault Analysis on 3DES Middle Rounds Based on Error Propagation,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 68-78, 2022, doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.117

Citation:

MA Xiangliang, ZHANG Lizhen, WU Liji, et al., “Differential Fault Analysis on 3DES Middle Rounds Based on Error Propagation,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 68-78, 2022, doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.117

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Differential Fault Analysis on 3DES Middle Rounds Based on Error Propagation

doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.117

MA Xiangliang^1
,,
ZHANG Lizhen^2
,,
WU Liji^1
,,
LI Xia^2
,,
ZHANG Xiangmin^1
,,
LI Bing^2
,,
LIU Yuling^{3, 4
,}

1.
School of Integrated Circuits, Tsinghua University, Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology, Beijing 100084, China
2.
National Research Center for Information Technology Security, Beijing 100084, China
3.
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
4.
School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 101408, China

Funds: This work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2018YFB0904901) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (61702508, 61802404)

More Information

Author Bio:
received the Ph.D. degree from University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2020. He is now a Postdoctoral Researcher in Tsinghua University. His research interests include information security and side channel attack. (Email: maxiangliang@tsinghua.edu.cn)

is now a cryptography Engineer in National Research Center for Information Technology Security. Her research interests include cryptographic algorithm application and side channel attack. (Email: 806271113@qq.com)

(corresponding author) received the Ph.D. degree from Tsinghua University in 1997. He is now an Associate Professor and Ph.D. Supervisor of the School of Integrated Circuits of Tsinghua University. His main research interests include integrated circuit and system and commercial information security. (Email: lijiwu@tsinghua.edu.cn)

is now a Senior Engineer in National Research Center for Information Technology Security. Her research interests include cyberspace security and information security evaluation. (Email: lixiaranran1@sina.com)

received the M.S. degree from Tsinghua University in 1991. He is now an Associate Researcher of the School of Integrated Circuits of Tsinghua University. His main research interests include information security and automotive electronics. (Email: zhxm@tsinghua.edu.cn)

is now a Senior Engineer in National Research Center for Information Technology Security. His research interests include cyberspace security and cryptographic algorithm application. (Email: lb0682@126.com)

received the Ph.D. degree from University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2013. He is now a Senior Engineer in Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences. His research interests include information security evaluation. (Email: liuyuling@iie.ac.cn)
Received Date: 2021-04-06
Accepted Date: 2021-07-07

Available Online: 2021-09-08

Publish Date: 2022-01-05

Abstract

Abstract

Since differential fault analysis (DFA) was first implemented on data encryption standard (DES), many scholars have improved this attack and extended the limit of the original last two rounds to the earlier rounds. However, the performance of the novel attacks which target middle rounds is not effective, i.e. the number of correct/incorrect ciphertexts required is very large and the recovered result maybe not correct. We address this problem by presenting new DFA methods that can break 3DES when injecting faults at round 12 or 13. By simulating the process of single-bit error propagation, we have built two kinds of error propagation models as well as an intermediate error propagation state table. Then we simplify the intermediate states into state templates that will be further used to locate the injected fault position, which is the main difficulty of implementing fault injection in the middle rounds. Finally, in terms of the idea of error propagation and probability theory, we can recover the last round key only using 2 sets of correct/incorrect ciphertexts when inducting fault in the 13th round and 4 sets of correct/incorrect ciphertexts when inducting fault in the 12th round.
- Fault injection,
- Differential fault analysis (DFA),
- Data encryption standard (DES),
- Error propagation model

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References(13)

References

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