Fault Analysis on a New Block Cipher DBlock with at Most Two Fault Injections

FENG Jingyi; CHEN Hua; GAO Si; CAO Weiqiong; FAN Limin; ZHU Shaofeng

doi:10.1049/cje.2018.09.003

Volume 27 Issue 6

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FENG Jingyi, CHEN Hua, GAO Si, et al., “Fault Analysis on a New Block Cipher DBlock with at Most Two Fault Injections,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 1277-1282, 2018, doi: 10.1049/cje.2018.09.003

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FENG Jingyi, CHEN Hua, GAO Si, et al., “Fault Analysis on a New Block Cipher DBlock with at Most Two Fault Injections,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 1277-1282, 2018, doi: 10.1049/cje.2018.09.003

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Fault Analysis on a New Block Cipher DBlock with at Most Two Fault Injections

doi: 10.1049/cje.2018.09.003

1.
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
2.
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China

Funds: This work is supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) (No.2013CB338002).

Received Date: 2016-04-14
Rev Recd Date: 2016-09-18
Publish Date: 2018-11-10

Abstract

Abstract

DBlock is a new family of block ciphers proposed by Wu et al. in Science China in 2015, which consists of three variants specified as DBlock-128/192/256. DBlock-n employs a 20-round Feistel-type structure with n-bit block size and n-bit key size. We propose the first fault analysis on DBlock and show that no more than 2 pairs of correct/faulty ciphertexts are needed to retrieve the master key. In the attack, a byte-oriented fault is injected in round 16, and three properties including differential distribution of the Sbox, bijection nature of the linear function and Feistel-type key scheduling are fully utilized to distinguish between the correct and wrong keys. A fault position guessing strategy based on known intermediates is adopted, which efficiently makes the known-fault attack apply to the random fault model. The experimental results show that, with a pair of ciphertexts, 11.820-bit exhaustive search is needed to derive the whole 128-bit key on average. With 2 pairs of ciphertexts, the unique key can be determined within 6.5 minutes.
- Fault analysis,
- Random fault model,
- Block cipher,
- DBlock

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References(15)

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