Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks

WANG Gang; LENG Jie; YUAN Cangzhou

doi:10.1049/cje.2015.04.029

Volume 24 Issue 2

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Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2015 > 24(2): 398-401

WANG Gang, LENG Jie, YUAN Cangzhou, “Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 398-401, 2015, doi: 10.1049/cje.2015.04.029

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WANG Gang, LENG Jie, YUAN Cangzhou, “Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 398-401, 2015, doi: 10.1049/cje.2015.04.029

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Repeated Inter-Session Network Coding Games with an Average Cost Share Pricing Mechanism in Congested Networks

doi: 10.1049/cje.2015.04.029

1.
School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China;
2.
School of Software, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China

Funds: This work was supported by the Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61221061), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61271194).

More Information

Corresponding author: YUAN Cangzhou currently is an associate professor of School of software at Beihang University. His research fields include embedded system security, mobile cloud computing and cyber-physical systems. (Email:yuancz@buaa.edu.cn)
Publish Date: 2015-04-10

Abstract

Abstract

It is important to analyze the efficiency of resource allocation with game theory in congested networks in which the users are selfish. The results are often obtained from a one-shot game, while in reality, the transmission is frequent and occurs more than once. We develop a repeated inter-session network coding game that is based on a novel Average cost share (ACS) pricing mechanism. The users choose repeated transmission rates and transmission modes between network coding and routing to maximize their own payoffs. The Price of anarchy (PoA) is adopted to analyze the efficiency of the resource allocation. Through considering different strategies for the multiusers at the next stage, we find that network coding can improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the congested networks. We discuss trigger strategies that keep players from routing at new stages.
- Network coding (NC),
- Average cost sharing (ACS),
- Repeated games,
- PoA

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References(5)

References

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