Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher

YANG Yunxiao; SUN Bing; LIU Guoqiang

doi:10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

Volume 32 Issue 2

Mar. 2023

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Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2023 > 32(2): 217-224

YANG Yunxiao, SUN Bing, LIU Guoqiang, “Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 217-224, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

Citation:

YANG Yunxiao, SUN Bing, LIU Guoqiang, “Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 217-224, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

YANG Yunxiao, SUN Bing, LIU Guoqiang, “Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 217-224, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

Citation:

YANG Yunxiao, SUN Bing, LIU Guoqiang, “Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 217-224, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

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Cryptanalysis of Full-Round Magpie Block Cipher

doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.209

YANG Yunxiao^1
,,
SUN Bing^{1, 2, 4
,},
LIU Guoqiang^{1, 3
,}

1.
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
2.
State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing 100878, China
3.
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing 100093, China
4.
Hunan Engineering Research Center of Commercial Cryptography Theory and Technology Innovation, Changsha 410073, China

Funds: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61772545, 61702537, 62002370) and State Key Laboratory of Information Security (2020-MS-02)

More Information

Author Bio:
Yunxiao YANG was born in 1996. He is an M.S. candidate of College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, National University of Defense Technology. His research interest is cryptanalysis. (Email: yyx23@live.com)

Bing SUN (corresponding author) is an Associate Professor in National University of Defense Technology. He received the Ph.D. degree from National University of Defense Technology in 2009. His research interests include the cryptography, especially cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives. (Email: happy_come@163.com)

Guoqiang LIU is an Associate Professor in National University of Defense Technology. He received the Ph.D. degree from Information Science and Technology Institute in 2015. His current interests include the cryptography, especially cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives. (Email: liuguoqiang87@hotmail.com)
Received Date: 2021-06-15
Accepted Date: 2021-12-01

Available Online: 2022-02-24

Publish Date: 2023-03-05

Abstract

Abstract

Magpie is a lightweight block cipher proposed by Li et al. in Acta Electronica Sinica volumn 45, issue 10. It adopts an substitution-permutation network (SPN) structure with a block size of 64 bits and the key size of 96 bits, respectively. To achieve the consistency of the encryption and decryption, which is both hardware and software friendly, 16 bits of the key are used as control signals to select S-boxes and another 16 bits of the key are used to determine the order of the operations. As the designers claimed, the security might be improved as different keys generate different ciphers. This paper analyzes the security of Magpie, studies the difference propagation of Magpie, and finally finds that the cipher has a set of 2⁸⁰ weak keys which makes the full-round encryption weak, and corrects the lower bound of the number of active S-boxes to 10 instead of 25 proposed by the designers. In the weak key model, the security of the cipher is reduced by the claimed 2⁸⁰ to only 4×2¹⁶.
- Block cipher,
- Differential cryptanalysis,
- Weak key,
- Active S-boxes,
- Magpie

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References(19)

References

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