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JIAO Zhipeng, CHEN Hua, FENG Jingyi, KUANG Xiaoyun, YANG Yiwei, LI Haoyuan, FAN Limin. A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics. doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.089
Citation: JIAO Zhipeng, CHEN Hua, FENG Jingyi, KUANG Xiaoyun, YANG Yiwei, LI Haoyuan, FAN Limin. A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics. doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.089

A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique

doi: 10.1049/cje.2021.00.089
Funds:  This work is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.2018YFB0904900, No.2018YFB0904901)
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  • Author Bio:

    received the B.E. degree in computer science from Zhengzhou University. He is a Ph.D. candidate of Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. His research interests include SCA and protection. (Email: zhipeng2017@iscas.ac.cn)

    (corresponding author) received the Ph.D. degree in Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. She is currently a Research Professor with the Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include side-channel cryptanalysis,automatic cryptanalysis, and randomness test. (Email: chenhua@iscas.ac.cn)

    received the Ph.D. degree in Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include security evaluation and improvement for cryptographic devices. (Email: fengjingyi@tca.iscas.ac.cn)

  • Received Date: 2021-03-09
  • Accepted Date: 2021-06-07
  • Available Online: 2021-09-23
  • Side-channel attack (SCA) and Fault attack (FA) are two classical physical attacks against cryptographic implementation. In order to resist them, we present a combined countermeasure scheme which can resist both SCA and FA. The scheme combines the Threshold implementation (TI) and duplication-based exchange technique. The exchange technique can confuse the fault propagation path and randomize the faulty values. The TI technique can ensure a provable security against SCA. Moreover, it can also help to resist the FA by its incomplete property and random numbers. Compared with other methods, the proposed scheme has simple structure, which can be easily implemented in hardware and result in a low implementation cost. Finally, we present a detailed design for the block cipher LED and implement it. The hardware cost evaluation shows our scheme has the minimum overhead factor.
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