ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, FENG Dengguo. Differential Fault Attack on Camellia[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics, 2009, 18(1): 13-19.
Citation: ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, FENG Dengguo. Differential Fault Attack on Camellia[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics, 2009, 18(1): 13-19.

Differential Fault Attack on Camellia

  • Received Date: 2007-11-01
  • Rev Recd Date: 2008-04-01
  • Publish Date: 2009-02-15
  • Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit blockcipher in NESSIE project, and is also certified as the international IETF standard cipher for SSL/TLS cipher suites.In this study, we present an effcient differential fault attack on Camellia. Ideally, by using our techniques, on average, the complete key of Camellia-128 is recovered with64 faulty ciphertexts while the full keys of Camellia-192and Camellia-256 are retrieved with 96 faulty ciphertexts.Our attack is applicable to generic block ciphers with overall Fiestel structure using a SPN round function.All theseattacks have been successfully put into experimental simulations on a personal computer.
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      沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

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