A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique

JIAO Zhipeng; CHEN Hua; FENG Jingyi; KUANG Xiaoyun; YANG Yiwei; LI Haoyuan; FAN Limin

doi:10.23919/cje.2021.00.089

Volume 32 Issue 2

Mar. 2023

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Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2023 > 32(2): 199-208

JIAO Zhipeng, CHEN Hua, FENG Jingyi, et al., “A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 199-208, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.089

Citation:

JIAO Zhipeng, CHEN Hua, FENG Jingyi, et al., “A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 199-208, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.089

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A Combined Countermeasure Against Side-Channel and Fault Attack with Threshold Implementation Technique

doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.089

JIAO Zhipeng^{1, 2
,},
CHEN Hua^1
,,
FENG Jingyi^{1, 2
,},
KUANG Xiaoyun³,
YANG Yiwei³,
LI Haoyuan^{1, 2},
FAN Limin¹

1.
Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
2.
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
3.
Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid, Guangzhou 510663, China

Funds: This work was supported by National Key Research and Development Program of China (2018YFB0904900, 2018YFB0904901)

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Author Bio:
Zhipeng JIAO received the B.E. degree in computer science and technology from Zhengzhou University. He is a Ph.D. candidate of Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. His research interests include side-channel attack and protection. (Email: zhipeng2017@iscas.ac.cn)

Hua CHEN (corresponding author) received the Ph.D. degree in Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. She is currently a Research Professor with the Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include side-channel cryptanalysis, automatic cryptanalysis, and randomness test. (Email: chenhua@iscas.ac.cn)

Jingyi FENG received the Ph.D. degree in Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include security evaluation and improvement for cryptographic devices. (Email: fengjingyi@tca.iscas.ac.cn)
Received Date: 2021-03-09
Accepted Date: 2021-06-07

Available Online: 2021-09-23

Publish Date: 2023-03-05

Abstract

Abstract

Side-channel attack (SCA) and fault attack (FA) are two classical physical attacks against cryptographic implementation. In order to resist them, we present a combined countermeasure scheme which can resist both SCA and FA. The scheme combines threshold implementation and duplication-based exchange techniques. The exchange technique can confuse the fault propagation path and randomize the faulty values. The threshold implementation technique can ensure a provable security against SCA. Moreover, it can also help to resist the FA by its incomplete property and random numbers. Compared with other methods, the proposed scheme has simple structure, which can be easily implemented in hardware and result in a low implementation cost. Finally, we present a detailed design for the block cipher light encryption device (LED) and implement it. The hardware cost evaluation shows our scheme has the minimum overhead factor.
- Side-channel attack,
- Fault attack,
- Combined countermeasure,
- Threshold implementation

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References(31)

References

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