Analytical Models of on-Chip Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Radiated Emission Characteristics

ZHANG Fan; ZHANG Dongrong; REN Qiang; CHEN Aixin; SU Donglin

doi:10.23919/cje.2022.00.310

Volume 33 Issue 2

Mar. 2024

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2024 > 33(2): 385-392

Fan ZHANG, Dongrong ZHANG, Qiang REN, et al., “Analytical Models of on-Chip Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Radiated Emission Characteristics,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 385–392, 2024 doi: 10.23919/cje.2022.00.310

Citation:

Fan ZHANG, Dongrong ZHANG, Qiang REN, et al., “Analytical Models of on-Chip Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Radiated Emission Characteristics,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 385–392, 2024 doi: 10.23919/cje.2022.00.310

Citation:

PDF( 16848 KB)

Analytical Models of on-Chip Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Radiated Emission Characteristics

doi: 10.23919/cje.2022.00.310

ZHANG Fan^1
,,
ZHANG Dongrong^2
,,
REN Qiang^1
,,
CHEN Aixin^1
,,
SU Donglin^{1, 3
,
,}

1.
School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
2.
Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing 100094, China
3.
The Research Institute for Frontier Science, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China

More Information

Author Bio:
Fan ZHANG received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in electrical engineering from UESTC, Chengdu, China, in 2012 and 2015, respectively. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree at Beihang University, Beijing, China. His current research interests include antennas and radiation emission identification in EMC area. (Email: fanzhangee@buaa.edu.cn)

Dongrong ZHANG received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Beihang University, Beijing, China, in 2016, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical science and technology from Beihang University, Beijing, China, in 2022. In August 2022, he joined the Zhongguancun Laboratory as an Assistant Researcher. His current research field is hardware security and reliability, which include on-chip monitoring, physical design, on-chip dynamic adaptation methodologies, and counterfeit IC/PCB detection. (Email: dongrongzhang@buaa.edu.cn)

Qiang REN received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Beihang University, Beijing, China, in 2008, and the M.S. degrees in electrical engineering from the Institute of Acoustics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, in 2011, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from Duke University, Durham, NC, USA, in 2015. From 2016 to 2017, he was a Postdoctoral Researcher with the Computational Electromagnetics and Antennas Research Laboratory (CEARL), The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA. In September 2017, he joined the School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China, as an “Excellent Hundred” Associate Professor. His current research interests include numerical methods for multiscale and multiphysics modeling, metasurfaces, inverse scattering, and parallel computing. (Email: qiangren@buaa.edu.cn)

Aixin CHEN received the Ph.D. degree in electromagnetic field and microwave technology from University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China, in 1999. From 2000 to 2002, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow with the School of Electronic Information and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China, where he is currently a Professor. His research interests mainly include antennas and electromagnetic compatibility. (Email: axchen@buaa.edu.cn)

Donglin SU received the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from Beihang University (BUAA), Beijing, China, in 1983, 1986, and 1999, respectively. In 1986, she joined the Faculty of School of Electronics and Information Engineering, BUAA, where she was first an Assistant, then a Lecturer, later on an Associate Professor, and is currently a Full Professor. Her research interests include the numerical methods for microwave and millimeter-wave integrated circuits and systematic electromagnetic compatibility design of various aircrafts. (Email: sdl@buaa.edu.cn)
Corresponding author: Email: sdl@buaa.edu.cn
Received Date: 2022-09-14
Accepted Date: 2022-10-20

Available Online: 2022-11-14

Publish Date: 2024-03-05

Abstract

Abstract

Since many third parties involved in integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing, hardware Trojans malicious implantation have become a threat to the IC industry. Therefore, varieties of reliable hardware Trojan detection methods are needed. Since electromagnetic radiation is an inherent phenomenon of electronic devices, there are significant differences in the electromagnetic radiated characteristics for circuits with different structures and operating states. In this paper, a novel hardware Trojan detection method is proposed, which considers the electromagnetic radiation differences caused by hardware Trojan implantation. Experiments of detecting hardware Trojan in field programmable gate arrays show that the proposed method can effectively distinguish the ICs with Trojan from the ones without Trojan by the radiated emission.
- Hardware Trojan,
- Radiated emission,
- Integrated circuit

FullText(HTML)

References(23)

References

[1]	X. X. Wang, D. R. Zhang, M. He, et al., “Secure scan and test using obfuscation throughout supply Chain,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 37, no. 9, pp. 1867–1880, 2018. doi: 10.1109/TCAD.2017.2772817
[2]	D. Forte, S. Bhunia, and M. M. Tehranipoor, Hardware Protection through Obfuscation. Springer, Cham, Switzerland, pp.3-5, 2017.
[3]	M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A survey of hardware Trojan taxonomy and detection,” IEEE Design & Test of Computers, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 10–25, 2010. doi: 10.1109/MDT.2010.7
[4]	M. M. Tehranipoor, U. Guin, and S. Bhunia, “Invasion of the hardware snatchers,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 36–41, 2017. doi: 10.1109/MSPEC.2017.7906898
[5]	S. Adee, “The hunt for the kill switch,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 34–39, 2008. doi: 10.1109/MSPEC.2008.4505310
[6]	J. Kumagai, “Chip detectives [reverse engineering],” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 37, no. 11, pp. 43–48, 2000. doi: 10.1109/6.880953
[7]	S. Bhunia, M. S. Hsiao, M. Banga, et al., “Hardware Trojan attacks: Threat analysis and countermeasures,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1229–1247, 2014. doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2014.2334493
[8]	D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, et al., “Trojan detection using IC fingerprinting,” in Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Berkeley, CA, USA, pp.296–310, 2007.
[9]	R. S. Chakraborty, S. Narasimhan, and S. Bhunia, “Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions,” in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International High Level Design Validation and Test Workshop, San Francisco, CA, USA, pp.166–171, 2009.
[10]	X. X. Wang, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, “Detecting malicious inclusions in secure hardware: Challenges and solutions,” in Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Anaheim, CA, USA, pp.15–19, 2008.
[11]	Y. Q. Lv, Q. Zhou, Y. C. Cai, et al, “Trusted Integrated Circuits: The Problem and Challenges.”, Journal of Computer Science and Technology, vol. 29 , pp.918–928, 2014.
[12]	R. Torrance and D. James, “Reverse engineering in the semiconductor industry,” in Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Custom Integrated Circuits Conference, San Jose, CA, USA, pp.429–436, 2007.
[13]	J. A. Kash, J. C. Tsang, and D. R. Knebel, “Method and apparatus for reverse engineering integrated circuits by monitoring optical emission,” US Patent US6496022B1, 2002-12-17.
[14]	J. Aarestad, D. Acharyya, R. Rad, et al., “Detecting trojans through leakage current analysis using multiple supply pad I_DDQs,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 893–904, 2010. doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2010.2061228
[15]	Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, “Consistency-based characterization for IC Trojan detection,” in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design-Digest of Technical Papers, San Jose, CA, USA, pp.123–127, 2009.
[16]	M. Potkonjak, A. Nahapetian, M. Nelson, et al., “Hardware Trojan horse detection using gate-level characterization,” in Proceedings of the 2009 46th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, San Francisco, CA, USA, pp.688–693, 2009.
[17]	J. Li and J. Lach, “At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan Horse detection,” in Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Anaheim, CA, USA, pp.8–14, 2008.
[18]	Y. K. Tang, S. Q. Li, L. Fang, et al., “Golden-chip-free hardware trojan detection through quiescent thermal maps,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 27, no. 12, pp. 2872–2883, 2019. doi: 10.1109/TVLSI.2019.2933441
[19]	B. Y. Zhou, A. Aksoylar, K. Vigil, et al., “Hardware Trojan detection using backside optical imaging,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 24–37, 2021. doi: 10.1109/TCAD.2020.2991680
[20]	D. L. Su, S. G. Xie, A. X. Chen, et al., “Basic emission waveform theory: A novel interpretation and source identification method for electromagnetic emission of complex systems,” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 1330–1339, 2018. doi: 10.1109/TEMC.2017.2771454
[21]	J. W. Wang, Z. W. Yan, C. S. Fu, et al., “Near-field precision measurement system of high-density integrated module,” IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 70, article no. 9509109, 2021. doi: 10.1109/TIM.2021.3078000
[22]	J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, The Design of Rijndael: AES-The Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer, Berlin, 2002.
[23]	H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and R. Karri, “On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development,” in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD), Asheville, NC, USA, pp.471–474, 2013.