WU Xiaobing, CHEN Guihai. MONETA: Prior-free and Truthful Auctions with Adaptive Reserve Price for High Revenue in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics, 2012, 21(2): 355-361.
Citation: WU Xiaobing, CHEN Guihai. MONETA: Prior-free and Truthful Auctions with Adaptive Reserve Price for High Revenue in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks[J]. Chinese Journal of Electronics, 2012, 21(2): 355-361.

MONETA: Prior-free and Truthful Auctions with Adaptive Reserve Price for High Revenue in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

  • Received Date: 2010-09-01
  • Rev Recd Date: 2011-08-01
  • Publish Date: 2012-04-25
  • Auction is efficient for spectrum allocation in future dynamic spectrum access networks. Truthful or strategy-proof auction is favorable since every bidder only needs to bid his true valuation and the auctioneer assigns spectra to bidders who value them most. Existing truthful spectrum auction schemes however either generate very low revenue for the auctioneer or need extra prior distribution information on the true valuation of bidders. Low revenue generation could discourage the auctioneers from leasing their spectra and it is usually hard to get prior information on bidders’ true evaluations on the spectra. In this paper, we propose a class of truthful spectrum auction schemes which bring higher revenue for the spectrum owners and do not need any prior information at the same time. We present both theoretical and simulation results of our proposed auction schemes.
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      沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

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