Differential Fault Attack on Camellia

ZHOU Yongbin; WU Wenling; XU Nannan; FENG Dengguo

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2009 > 18(1): 13-19

ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, et al., “Differential Fault Attack on Camellia,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 13-19, 2009,

Citation:

ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, et al., “Differential Fault Attack on Camellia,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 13-19, 2009,

ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, et al., “Differential Fault Attack on Camellia,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 13-19, 2009,

Citation:

ZHOU Yongbin, WU Wenling, XU Nannan, et al., “Differential Fault Attack on Camellia,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 13-19, 2009,

PDF( 423 KB)

Differential Fault Attack on Camellia

Received Date: 2007-11-01
Rev Recd Date: 2008-04-01
Publish Date: 2009-02-15

Abstract

Abstract

Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit blockcipher in NESSIE project, and is also certified as the international IETF standard cipher for SSL/TLS cipher suites.In this study, we present an effcient differential fault attack on Camellia. Ideally, by using our techniques, on average, the complete key of Camellia-128 is recovered with64 faulty ciphertexts while the full keys of Camellia-192and Camellia-256 are retrieved with 96 faulty ciphertexts.Our attack is applicable to generic block ciphers with overall Fiestel structure using a SPN round function.All theseattacks have been successfully put into experimental simulations on a personal computer.
- Camellia,
- Differential fault attack,
- Blockcipher