Necessary Condition for the Success of Synchronous GNSS Spoofing

WANG Yiwei; KOU Yanhong; HUANG Zhigang

doi:10.23919/cje.2021.00.307

Volume 32 Issue 3

May 2023

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Article Navigation > Chinese Journal of Electronics > 2023 > 32(3): 438-452

WANG Yiwei, KOU Yanhong, HUANG Zhigang, “Necessary Condition for the Success of Synchronous GNSS Spoofing,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 438-452, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.307

Citation:

WANG Yiwei, KOU Yanhong, HUANG Zhigang, “Necessary Condition for the Success of Synchronous GNSS Spoofing,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 438-452, 2023, doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.307

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Necessary Condition for the Success of Synchronous GNSS Spoofing

doi: 10.23919/cje.2021.00.307

1.
School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, China

Funds: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61271197)

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Author Bio:
Yiwei WANG received the B.S. and M.S. degrees from School of Telecommunications Engineering from Xidian University, China, in 2015 and 2018, respectively. He is currently a Ph.D. student in the School of Electronics and Information Engineering at Beihang University, China. His research interests include GNSS signal processing and high-performance receivers design. (Email: ywwang@buaa.edu.cn)

Yanhong KOU (corresponding author) received the Ph.D. degree from Beihang University in 2006. She is an Associate Professor in the School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China. Her research interests include high-performance GNSS receivers and simulators, signal processing, and satellite communication. (Email: kouy@buaa.edu.cn)

Zhigang HUANG received the Ph.D. degree from Beihang University in 2004. He is a Full Professor in the School of Electronics and Information Engineering at Beihang University. His research interests include wireless indoor positioning and integrity algorithms. (Email: baahzg@163.com)
Received Date: 2021-08-26
Accepted Date: 2022-07-06

Available Online: 2022-07-26

Publish Date: 2023-05-05

Abstract

Abstract

A synchronous GNSS generator spoofer aims at directly taking over the tracking loops of the receiver with the lowest possible spoofing to signal ratio (SSR) without forcing it to lose lock. This paper investigates the factors that affect spoofing success and their relationships. The necessary conditions for successful spoofing are obtained by deriving the code tracking error in the presence of spoofing and analyzing the effects of SSR, spoofing synchronization errors, and receiver settings on the S-curve ambiguity and code tracking trajectory. The minimum SSRs for a successful spoofing calculated from the theoretical formulation agree with Monte Carlo simulations at digital intermediate frequency signal level within 1 dB when the spoofer pulls the code phase in the same direction as the code phase synchronization error, and the required SSRs can be much lower when pulling in the opposite direction. The maximum spoofing code phase error for a successful spoofing is tested by using TEXBAT datasets, which coincides with the theoretical results within 0.1 chip. This study reveals the mechanism of covert spoofing and can play a constructive role in the future development of spoofing and anti-spoofing methods.
- Spoofing,
- Anti-spoofing,
- Synchronization,
- Spoofing to signal ratio (SSR),
- Tracking loop

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References(23)

References

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