Citation: | Yunqiang LI and Ting CUI, “Linear Forgery Attacks on the Authenticated Encryption Cipher ACORN-like,” Chinese Journal of Electronics, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 1–9, 2025 doi: 10.23919/cje.2023.00.016 |
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